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I. INTRODUCTION

In late January 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Marcia
Lewis to reveal to a grand jury communications she had with her daughter, Monica
Lewinsky, regarding Monica’s relations with President Bill Clinton.2 While most
Americans were appalled by such behavior,3 these tactics are not new nor are they
uncontroversial. Academics and courts in the United States have been grappling
with the issue of compelled parent or child testimony for more than twenty-five

1

Associate, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC Office. J.D., 1999, Georgetown
University Law Center; B.S., 1994, Webb Institute of Naval Architecture. The author thanks
her husband, Amish M. Shah, for all of his help and support, and dedicates this article in
memory of her mother, Surekha S. Dharia, whose strength, kindness and love have guided her.
2

See Peter Baker, Lewinsky Met Privately with Clinton After Subpoena, WASH. POST,
January 29, 1998, at A1. President Clinton was alleged to have met privately with Monica
Lewinsky urging her to lie under oath about their relationship during a deposition for Paula
Jones’ case of sexual harassment against the President.
3

Letter from Alex Abrams, Lawyer, to Editor, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at A16; David
J. Wolfsohn & John S. Summers, Needed In Law and Society: Parent-Child Privilege, PHILA.
INQUIRER, February 26, 1998, at A15; Robert Peterson & Gerald Uelmen, Commentary:
Starr’s Legacy May Include a New Privilege; Law: Compelling Monica Lewinsky’s Mother to
Testify Has Spawned Calls for Protecting Parent-Child Communications, L.A. TIMES, April
23, 1998, at B9.
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years.4 In March 1998, Congress introduced two bills concerning parent-child
compelled testimony.5 The House of Representatives proposed substantive changes
to the Federal Rules of Evidence to recognize a parent-child privilege in all cases.6
The Senate proposed a study evaluating the necessity of a parent-child privilege, and,
if found to be necessary, an evaluation of the type of privilege to institute.7 Under
the Senate bill, a parent-child privilege would not extend to cases involving violence
or drugs.8
This article uses the recent bills in the House and Senate to analyze the parentchild privilege debate. First, this article will discuss the history of the parent-child
privilege. Next, the proposed bills will be evaluated to determine their effectiveness
in achieving their goals and in resolving the debate. This article will then discuss the
effects that the passage or nonpassage of these bills (particularly the House bill)
would have. Finally, this article proposes a broad parent-child privilege.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
Although controversial, the idea of a parent-child privilege is not new. In fact,
the parent-child testimonial privilege has existed since ancient times.9 Ancient
Jewish law specifically forbade a parent from testifying against his or her children,
and the Romans mandated that parents, children, patrons, freemen and slaves could
not testify against each other.10 Currently, the laws of France, Germany and Sweden
embody a parent-child privilege whereby no relative by blood or marriage may be
forced to testify against each other.11 The United States does not, for the most part,
recognize such a privilege.
The United States does recognize several privileges, including the attorney-client
privilege, physician-patient privilege, priest-penitent privilege, psychotherapistpatient privilege, and spousal privilege.12 However, only two federal district courts13

4
Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of the Parent-Child Testimonial
Privilege: Too Big for Its Britches? 26 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 145, n.1 (1984), citing Daniel
R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK.
L. REV. 599 (1970).
5

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); and S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

6

See H.R. 3577.

7

See S. 1721.

8

Id.

9

Wendy M. Watts, The Parent-Child Privilege: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept,
28 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 583, 587 (1987).
10

Id. at 592

11

Id. at 593 (the prevailing view in the civil countries of Western Europe is that no person
will be forced to divulge confidences between himself and another family member).
12

Id. at 594.

13

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenburg), 11 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982).
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(located in Nevada and Connecticut) and four states14 (Idaho, Minnesota,
Massachusetts, and New York) recognize a parent-child privilege. Nine federal
circuits have explicitly rejected a parent-child privilege.15
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 501 enables courts to interpret and create
privileges governed by common law and in light of reason and experience.16
Commentators have formulated various tests to recognize a testimonial privilege.17
14

See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN. STAT, § 595.02(1)(j) (1997). New York has a
judicially-recognized privilege. See also People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422
N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979). Massachusetts law, while not recognizing a
parent-child privilege, prevents a minor child from testifying against a parent in a criminal
proceeding. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1998).
15
See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103
F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davies, 768
F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John
Doe), 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir.
1984).
16

FED. R. EVID. 501.

17

Dean Wigmore’s four factor formula to establish a new privilege is the most respected:

1) The communication must originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Manley has formulated a different test that focuses on whether the privilege satisfies the
following emotions and desires:
1) Instinctive revulsion against the betrayal of confidence.
2) A sense of compassion even for a transgressor, i.e. a feeling that there should be for
every man some sanctuary beyond the reach of society’s law where he may safely
confide his guilty secrets in an attempt to ease his troubled spirit.
3) A sense of fair play related to the Norman view of a lawsuit as a species of contest
or sporting event wherein it would be too easy, and hence unfair and against ‘the rules
of the game,’ to hound a man to his doom by convicting him through the lips of his
own intimate friends, family, or medical, legal, or spiritual advisors.
4) A desire to preserve the function of certain socially valuable relationships even at
the cost of occasional suppression of the truth and injustice in such, presumably few,
particular cases.
5) A feeling of individual and professional pride and self-importance in being the
inviolable repository of others’ secrets.
Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL. 288, 290
(1949).
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While the parent-child privilege arguably passes these tests, no circuit court has been
willing to recognize the privilege.18 Courts have been overwhelmingly opposed to
recognizing a parent-child privilege, broad or narrow, without legislative action.19
Although no circuit court has adopted the parent-child privilege, some have implied
possible recognition if federal law, rather than state law, controlled the case or if the
issue arose under different circumstances.20
In Jaffee v. Redmond,21 the Supreme Court for the first time recognized a
privilege that was not in existence at common law when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted in 1975: the psychotherapist-patient privilege.22 The Court
in Jaffee declared that Rule 501 did not “freeze the law,” and that whenever the
public and private interests furthered by the privilege outweigh the cost to the search
for the truth, a new privilege should be recognized.23 The Third Circuit, the first to
consider the parent-child privilege after Jaffee, declined to do so based on four basic
reasons:
(1) The overwhelming majority of all courts - federal or state - have
rejected such a privilege . . . . (2) No reasoned analysis of Federal Rules of
Evidence 501 or of the standards established by the Supreme Court or by
[the Third Circuit] supports the creation of such a privilege. (3) Creation
of such a privilege would have no impact on the parental relationship and
hence would neither benefit that relationship nor serve any social policy.
(4) Although [courts] have the authority to recognize a new privilege, the
recognition of such a privilege, if one is to be recognized, should be left to
Congress.24
The Third Circuit also stated that the privilege should not be created because it
does not pass the second and fourth factors of the Wigmore test:25 confidentiality in
the form of testimonial privilege is not indispensable for a successful parent-child
relationship, and the truth-seeking function of the judicial system outweighs the
relatively insignificant injury to the relationship resulting from non-recognition of
18

See cases cited supra note 15.

19

See id.

20

Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or Not to Tell? An Analysis of
Testimonial Privileges: The Parent-Child and Reporter’s Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 163, n.27, n.28 (1993), [hereinafter Note, To Tell or Not to Tell?] citing Port v.
Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985)(indicating defendant’s father and stepfather would
have been excused if federal rather than Texas, law applied); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d
1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to address whether parent-child privilege should be adopted in
situations involving minors); and United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982)
(implying parent-child privileges may be applicable otherwise).
21

518 U.S. 1 (1996).

22

See id. See also Daniel Capra, A “New” Privilege: Parent-Child, N.Y. L. J., May 9,
1997, at 3.
23

518 U.S. 1 (1996).

24

In re grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-7 (3d Cir. 1997).

25

See supra note 17.
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the privilege.26 The dissent disagreed with these two points, finding that the
privilege is essential for parent-child relationships and that the injury is not
outweighed by the states’ interests.27
The Third Circuit stated that the legislature is best equipped to deal with such
issues as whether the privilege should apply to adult children, adopted children or
unemancipated minors, whether parents include stepparents or grandparents, whether
the privilege should extend to siblings, and whether the presence of another family
member automatically destroys the privilege.28 Generally, courts believe that a
matter with this kind of uncertainty is better left to the legislature.29
III. THE CONTROVERSY
There is great disagreement between courts and the majority of legal
commentators and academics over whether to recognize a parent-child testimonial
privilege.30 Because privileges obstruct the search for truth and because the
administration of justice relies on the court’s ability to hear all relevant evidence,
courts have been reluctant to expand existing privileges and create new ones.31 The
courts, reluctant to place any obstacles in the path of the judicial system’s truthseeking function, are not willing to incorporate a new privilege where the injury to
individual society members is arguably not outweighed by the state’s interest in
seeking the truth.32
The majority of legal commentators and academics on this subject, however, are
in favor of a parent-child privilege.33 Legal commentators and academics have
espoused the parent-child privilege based on a number of reasons. First, some legal
commentators and academics predicate the necessity of a parent-child privilege on
the Supreme Court’s recognition of the fundamental right to privacy and of familial
autonomy.34 Second, academics and commentators base the need for a privilege on
social reasons including the “violence done to the child, the damage to family unity,

26

See In re Grand Jury (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d. Cir. 1997).

27

Id. at 1160 (“confidentiality underlies the parent-child relationship.... the damage
resulting from compelling a parent against his child, in most if not all cases, outweighs the
benefit associated with correct disposal of the litigation”).
28

Id. at 1155.

29

See cases cited supra note 15.

30

Compare cases cited supra note 15 with Marianne Scott, Comment, Parent-Child
Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy,
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901 (1983); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100
HARV. L. REV. 910 (1987).
31

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 146.

32

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).

33

See id. at 1146, n.12 (citing numerous law review articles in favor of a parent-child
privilege).
34
Marianne Scott, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and
Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901 (1983); see also
supra note 9.
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and the consequent injury to society”35 that may result from compelled testimony of
a child against a parent.36 Third, academics and commentators believe that a parentchild privilege should exist for reasons similar to those reasons for the existence of
currently recognized privileges: to protect potentially embarrassing communications
which were engaged in for the purpose of guidance.37
Among commentators in favor of the parent-child privilege, there exists
controversy over how broadly to construe the privilege. The debate is over several
issues including whether adult children or only unemancipated children are covered,
whether the privilege is reciprocal in that parents may not testify against children and
children may not testify against parents, and whether only confidential
communications are covered or all adverse testimony is protected.38 Although legal
commentators and courts generally disagree on whether or not to have a parent-child
privilege, many legal commentators also advocate for a legislative resolution, rather
than the courts “creating” law.39
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recently, Congress rose to the courts’ and commentators’ challenge to legislate
regarding the parent-child privilege. Congress, spurred by Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr’s investigation of Monica Lewinsky,40 finally responded in March of
1998 and introduced two separate bills dealing with the issue of parent-child
compelled testimony.41 The House bill proposed substantive changes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence to explicitly recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege.42 The
35
J. Tyson Covey, Note, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and
Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 879 (1990); see also
Scott, supra note 34.
36

Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910 (1987)
(arguing that strong and supportive parent-child bonds are so important to society that they
should be protected by a testimonial privilege); see also Covey, supra note 35.
37

See Ayala & Martyn, supra note 20.

38

Compare Franklin, supra note 4 (arguing for a privilege limited to minor children, nonreciprocal with only communication from the child to the parent protected, and protecting only
confidential communications, not all adverse testimony) with Scott, supra note 34 (arguing for
a privilege including adult children, reciprocal in nature, held by both parties, and protecting
adverse testimony as well as confidential communications).
39

See, e.g., Covey, supra note 35; and Capra, supra note 22.

40

See 144 CONG. REC. E504-01 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
(“there now exists a serious defect in our Federal criminal and civil law and procedures that
has unfortunately been brought into focus by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s
investigation of the President. Under Federal law and the law of most States, children can be
compelled to testify against their parents, and parents against their children”). See also 144
CONG. REC. S1508-02 (daily ed. March 6, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I recently spoke
. . . about the disgust that I share with most Americans about the tactics of Special Prosecutor
Kenneth Starr and the disturbing spectacle of hauling a mother before a grand jury to reveal
her intimate conversations with her daughter in a matter . . . which do[es] not pose [a] grave
threat to the public safety”).
41

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

42

See H.R. 3577.
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Senate proposed the Attorney General investigate to determine whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence should be amended to explicitly recognize a parent-child
privilege.43 The following section will individually examine both bills in light of
prior judicial decisions and writings of legal commentators regarding what each
believes to be the proper analysis of the parent-child privilege.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE BILL
The House bill, named the Confidence in the Family Act, proposed a substantive
amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence 501 specifically allowing for a parent-child
privilege.44 The House proposed in relevant part that Rule 501 of Federal Rules of
Evidence be amended to include the following:
(b)(1) A witness may not be compelled to testify against a child or parent
of the witness.
(2) A witness may not be compelled to disclose the content of a
confidential communication with a child or parent of the witness.
(3) For purposes of this subdivision, ‘child’ means, with respect to an
individual, a birth, adoptive, or step-child of the individual, and any
person (such as a foster child or a relative of whom the individual has
long-term custody) with respect to whom the court recognizes the
individual as having a right to act as a parent.
(4) The privileges provided in this subdivision shall be governed by
principles of the common law, as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience, that are similar to
the principles that apply to the similar privileges of a witness with respect
to a spouse of a witness.”45
The issue is whether this bill is well drafted in that it achieves the primary goals
of a parent-child privilege with minimal intrusion on the truth-seeking function of
the law.46
A. Goals of the Confidence in the Family Act
The House bill would ensure that parents and children would not be compelled to
testify against one another.47 This shields witnesses from the trauma associated with
testifying against a child or parent and creates recognition and respect for the special
nature of parent-child relationships.48 Two goals can be ascertained. One goal is to
protect parent-child witnesses from the “cruel trilemma” whereby the witness is
43

See S. 1721.

44

See H.R. 3577.

45

Id. (emphasis added).

46

See Covey, supra note 35, at 887.

47

See H.R. 3577.

48

See 144 CONG. REC. E504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
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faced with three disagreeable options: (1) testify truthfully and betray their family;
(2) refuse to testify and risk contempt charges; or (3) testify falsely and hinder the
truth-seeking function of the judicial system even more.49 The second goal is to
protect children’s and parents’ reasonable expectations of privacy when seeking
guidance, comfort or support.50 This bill would acknowledge respect for the familial
sphere and allow and foster open communication between parents and children, thus
protecting the parent-child relationship, like the spousal relationship, from undue
governmental intrusions.51 These goals would lend support to the Constitution’s
insistence that law enforcement officials respect the privacy of the individual and the
home52 as well as protect children.
The purposes of the spousal privilege are similar. The adverse testimony
privilege serves to protect the marriage from disharmony, while the confidential
communications privilege serves to encourage open communication within a
marriage.53 Both relationships, spousal and parent-child, are clearly regarded as
valuable to society.54 Similar to the spousal privilege, the parent-child privilege
would continue to protect the familial sphere and demonstrate the government’s
respect for confidentiality within the family.55
B. Reciprocity
The House bill takes a clear position on the controversy surrounding the parentchild privilege.56 The Confidence in the Family Act provides for a reciprocal
privilege.57 The bill provides that a child may not be compelled to testify against a
parent and a parent may not be compelled to testify against a child.58 Almost all
existing or proposed parent-child privilege statutes restrict coverage to

49

See id.; see also Watts, supra note 9.

50

See 144 CONG. REC. E504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).

51

Covey, supra note 35, at 888 (legislators should keep in mind two primary goals when
drafting a statute recognizing the parent-child privilege: (1) protect children’s reasonable
expectations of privacy; and (2) protect minor children from the traumatic and potentially
destructive experience of testifying against their parents or having their parents testify against
them).
52

Sandra Guerra, Family Values? The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset
Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1996).
53
See Franklin supra note 4; see also Watts, supra note 9, at 598 (“the Court [in Trammel
v. United States, 445, U.S. 40 (1980)] reasoned that the justification for the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony lies in the privilege’s perceived role in fostering harmony and
sanctity of the marriage relationship”).
54

See id.

55

See Covey, supra note 35.

56

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

57

See id.

58

See id. (emphasis added).
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communications from child to parent.59 Justifications for this restriction are based
on the reasoning that the parent-child privilege should resemble a professional
privilege.60 Advocates of a non-reciprocal parent-child privilege believe that the
main goal for a parent-child privilege is to allow children to seek guidance and help,
and that this goal outweighs the impediment on the government’s truth-seeking
function.61 Proponents of this belief insist that children require parental advice and
guidance more than parents require advice from children.62 Furthermore, these
advocates argue that children expect communications with their parents to remain
confidential, more so than parents expect of their conversations with their children.63
The need to protect parents from children’s divulgence, it is believed, is not as great
as the need to protect children from parents’ disclosures.64 Parents’ communications
with the child not concerned with guidance for the child, therefore, should remain
unprotected according to advocates of this belief.65
Reciprocity, however, better realizes the goal of protecting parents and children
from the cruel trilemma - to spare the children from the traumatic experience of
having to betray their parents or of having their parents betray them.66 Furthermore,
the professional-relationship goal of seeking guidance is well served by reciprocity.
As parents and children grow older, the roles often reverse - parents may look to
children for guidance.67 This is more apparent with immigrant parents whose
children may be more assimilated into the American culture. The parents look to
their children for guidance about the different social, legal, and cultural ways of the
United States. Additionally, in today’s era of high divorce rates, parents and
children typically look to each other for guidance when spouses separate.68 The
spousal privilege allows for reciprocity because communication between both
spouses is essential; an ideal parent-child relationship should encompass the mutual
love, intimacy and trust associated with the marital relationship.69 The House bill’s
reciprocity protects a family’s expectations of privacy and allows for children and
parents to look to each other for guidance.

59
See Note, Covey, supra note 35, at 903. See also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN.
STAT, § 595.02(1)(j) (1997).
60

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172.

66

See Covey, supra note 35, at 904.

67

See Scott, supra note 34, at 919.

68

Id. at 919. It is estimated that approximately one-half of marriages end in divorce. It is
much more difficult to terminate a parent-child relationship than a marriage.
69
See Scott, supra note 34; but see Franklin, supra note 4, at 171 (arguing that
relationships of parent-child and spouses are fundamentally different; spouses look to each
other for guidance - two-way - whereas children look to parent for guidance - one-way).
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C. Confidential Communications vs. Adverse Testimony
The Confidence in the Family Act protects only confidential communications;70
adverse testimony is not protected. The House believes this would be the best
compromise between allowing prosecutors to search for the truth and respecting
familial privacy.71 By limiting the privilege to cover only those confidential
communications, the House limits the breadth of protection to only those
communications necessary for the guidance and emotional health of the child.72 The
House bill does allow for parents to offer needed guidance to their children without
fear of incriminating them while still allowing for the courts to search for the truth.
Proponents of this limitation on the privilege argue that a broader privilege extending
to adverse testimony would lead to abuse and is too intrusive on the state’s need to
gather evidence.73
Professional privileges also only cover confidential
communications; adverse testimony is not protected.74 The limitation to confidential
communications serves the purpose of allowing for openness when seeking
guidance, but does not relieve the witness of his or her trilemma.
The Supreme Court recognized an adverse testimony privilege in spousal
relations.75 In many states, the spousal privilege protects adverse testimony,
although some states do protect only confidential communications between
spouses.76 The adverse testimony privilege in the marital privilege serves mainly to
prevent marital disharmony.77 The House bill states the parent-child privilege should
be developed similar to the spousal privilege;78 however the bill already differs from
the spousal privilege in those states where an adverse testimony spousal privilege is
recognized. In view of the spousal privilege’s limitation in many states, a broader
parent-child privilege may seem overbroad.79 In these states, the confidential
communications limitation is appropriate. However, in parent-child communications,
confidential communications may be difficult to distinguish from other information
70

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

71

See 144 CONG. REC. 2504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).

72

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172.

73

Id.

74

See, e.g., Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 (Attorney-Client Privilege), Rule
504(b) (Psychotherapist-Patient) and Rule 506 (Clergymen). FED. R. EVID. DELETED AND
SUPERSEDED MATERIALS.
75

See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).

76

See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communication v. Familial Privilege, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1567 n.29-30 (1985). Fourteen states statutorily empower a party to
prevent a spouse from giving adverse testimony - Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Alaska, Four states’ statutes render a spouse incompetent to testify
against his or her spouse - Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. California, Florida, and
Wisconsin by statute recognize a confidential communications privilege.
77

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 153.

78

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

79

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 173.
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available to family members; another family member may learn of communications
as a result of the family’s familiarity with each other’s activities.80 In states where
only confidential communications are protected, both written and oral expressions
are protected.81 An expression is confidential if the communicator subjectively
intended the communication not be disclosed.82 There is a presumption that
communications between spouses are confidential, but this can be rebutted in two
ways: (1) if the spouse knew a third party was present; and (2) even if
communications were in private, a showing that the communicant intended
statements to be disclosed to specific third parties.83 Because determining whether a
communication is confidential may be extremely difficult in parent-child situations,
an adverse testimony privilege is more appropriate. An adverse testimony privilege
would be preferable to dissolve the dilemma of family betrayal and would likely be
more practical in view of the difficulties associated with a privilege limited to
confidential communications.
Limiting the privileged testimony to only those confidential communications
instead of the broader, adverse testimony approach does not serve the purposes of
protecting children from the trauma associated with testifying against their parents or
vice versa, of alleviating the witness’ trilemma, or of protecting the familial privacy.
Compelled parent-child testimony that leads to incriminating evidence would still
sever family ties, invite perjury, and cause trauma.84 Limiting the parent-child
privilege to only confidential communications does not achieve the goal of
preventing the trauma associated with the betrayal of a family member; parents and
children may still feel like they are betraying their family by giving testimony that is
adverse, for instance, negating alibis. The ABA Proposed Parent-Child Privilege
Statute85 recommended an adverse testimonial privilege for criminal trials and
confidential communications for civil trials. The sense of betrayal in criminal trials
would be greater when loss of liberty is at stake. In civil trials, the concern is not
whether betrayal leads to confinement but whether the expectations of confidentiality
were honored.86 A privilege protecting only confidential communications does not
completely eliminate the sense of betrayal that would accompany testifying
adversely when it would lead to loss of liberty, as it would in federal criminal trials.
80

See Scott, supra note 34, at 926.

81

See Developments in the Law - Privilege Communication v. Familial Privilege, supra
note 76, at 1572.
82

Id. at 1573.

83

Id.

84

See Scott, supra note 34, at 926.

85

See Watts, supra note 9, at 618-23. The ABA proposed a parent-child privilege which
provided for an adverse parent-child testimonial privilege held by the witness in criminal
trials, except when the defendant is charged with a crime against a family member and when
the witness is involved in any criminal activity. §102. The ABA proposal provided for a
confidential communications privilege jointly held by both parties in civil trials; exceptions to
the confidential communications privilege include when the parents and children are opposing
parties, when crimes are committed against a family member, and when mental competence is
at issue. § 103.
86

See Covey, supra note 35, at 905.
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The confidential communications privilege also raises a number of unanswered
questions such as how the law would be enforced. Does the parent or child
specifically have to say this conversation is confidential? Would that be realistic?
Additionally, it may be difficult to distinguish confidential communications from all
other communication.87 The goals of the privilege are not limited to allowing
children seeking guidance but include protecting the family from government
intrusion and decreasing the trauma to children. A broader privilege protecting
adverse testimony as well should be adopted in lieu of a narrower privilege
protecting only confidential communications. This would foster open
communications as well as relieve the witness of the sense of betrayal.
D. Definition of Child
The Confidence in the Family Act defines child broadly, leaving much discretion
to the courts. The definition of child includes a birth child, adoptive child, step-child
and anyone else the court recognizes as a ward of a person (including long-term
foster children).88 This leaves some discretion within the court to include primary
caretakers. This definition is broad, but accurately reflects today’s rapidly changing
family situations. The catchall provision protects those persons who are effectively
rather than just legally responsible for the children.89 This expansive definition is
preferable because it furthers the goal of protecting the child’s expectations of
confidentiality when requesting guidance from parents or parental figures. For
critics that argue such a broadness will lead to abuse and over-extension, the general
antipathy of courts in recognizing privileges should keep potential abuses in check
and will limit the use of this provision to those parent-child relationships that are
genuine.90
The House bill makes no mention of an age limitation to only apply the privilege
to minor children, which many statutes and courts advocate.91 By not limiting the
privilege to minors, Congress respects families in the broader sense. Just because
children grow older, they may not necessarily grow apart from their families.92 The
extension of the privilege beyond the child’s minority recognizes that many parentchild relationships continue after emancipation of the child, frequently leading to a
role reversal type situation as the parent grows older and becomes increasingly
dependent on the child.93 Furthermore, the bill acknowledges that children reside
with their parents until well after emancipation, and is consistent with the
requirement many states have that children support their parents as the states require

87

Id.

88

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong, 2d Sess. (1998).

89

See Covey, supra note 35, at 901.

90

Id. at 902.

91

Id. Practically all existing and proposed parent-child privileges apply only during a
child’s minority, including Idaho and Minnesota codes and the ABA Proposed Parent-Child
Privilege Statute, as discussed in Watts, supra note 9.
92

See Scott, supra note 34, at 918.

93

Id.
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parents to support their children.94 With the state requiring families to continue
support after emancipation of the children, it is only appropriate that the privilege
continues beyond that as well. Many commentators argue that the privilege is not
necessary once the child is grown as the child does not depend on the parent for
guidance.95 If protecting the child’s expectations of confidentiality and allowing him
or her to go to the parents for guidance were the only goals of the statute, this may
seem reasonable. However, an important goal of the statute is to protect families,
like the spousal privilege protects marriages.96 The family does not dissolve when a
member becomes older.97 Parent-child relationships continue through adulthood and
contribute to the well-being of individuals and society.98 Parent-child loyalty
existing beyond the child’s minority should be fostered for the benefit of society.
The inclusion of adult children in the parent-child privilege protects family loyalty
and better serves society.
E. Exceptions
The House bill makes no explicit exceptions to the parent-child privilege.
Advocates of the privilege acknowledge exceptions would be appropriate in certain
situations.99 Examples of these exceptions include crimes committed by a parent
against the child himself or other family members, and situations in which an adult
child is suspected of abusing an elderly parent.100 Each of the three existing state
statutes provides for an exception when a crime was committed against a family
member.101 In spousal privileges, which the bill states should guide in the
development of the parent-child privilege,102 the privilege does not apply if one
spouse committed a crime against another,103 and most states do not allow the spousal
94

Id. at 924. Parents are often obligated to continue support for physically or mentally
handicapped children past the age of majority. Id., n. 77. Additionally, after a divorce, the
noncustodial parent may be required to contribute to college expenses. Id. As of 1984, 27
states had filial support statutes. Id. n. 78.
95

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 170.

96

See 144 CONG. REC. E504-01 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
(“the damage that such an experience [providing testimony against children] can cause
parents, children, and familial relationships is readily apparent and worthy of our concern”).
97

See, e.g., Letter from Alex Abrams, lawyer, to Editor, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at
A16. (“Among young unmarried men and women, like Ms. Lewinsky, a bond with one or
both parents may often be the most intimate of all.”).
98
See Scott, supra note 34, at 919-20. “By serving as a reference point for people’s
beliefs, values, and choices of action, intergenerational ties help prevent such a fraying of the
fabric of society.” Id.
99

Id. at 927.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 927, n.90; see also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN. STAT, § 595.02(1)(j)
(1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1998).
102

See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

103

See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications v. Familial Privileges,
supra note 76, at 1570.
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privilege when one spouse is accused of abusing a child or another family
member.104 It can be reasonably inferred, therefore, that these exceptions are implied
in the bill through developed spousal privilege law and “in light of reason and
experience.”105
The statute does not specifically state who may waive the privilege, but in
spousal privileges, as modified by the Court in Trammel,106 an adverse testimony
privilege rests with the testifying spouse, and only that spouse may waive the
privilege.107 In federal criminal cases, a confidential communications privilege can
either be waived by the spouse who made the communication or by the defendant,
regardless of whether the defendant was the communicant.108 The bill does state the
privilege should be adopted similar to the spousal privilege. It would appear,
therefore, that the parent-child privilege would work in a similar fashion.
What would be protected under the statute? Monica Lewinsky’s mother in
Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Clinton would not have had to testify in
front of a grand jury as to what her daughter told her about her relations.109 Alan and
Sonye Grossberg of New Jersey would not have been subpoenaed to reveal what
their daughter told them about the death of her newborn son of whom their daughter
was accused of leaving in a motel dumpster.110 Mrs. Pisani, the mother of the
Massachusetts patrolman being investigated for cheating on his exams, would not
have been forced to refuse to testify.111 The ten-year-old child in South Dakota
would not have had to testify against his father in the murder trial of another child.112

104

Id. at 1570-71.

105

H.R. 3577.

106

445 U.S. 40 (1980).

107

See Franklin, supra note 4, at 153.

108

See Development in the Law - Privileged Communication v. Familial Privileges, supra
note 76, at 1571-72.
109

See Editorial, Mother and Witness; Painful or Not, Marcia Lewis’ Testimony is
Important, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, February 18, 1998, at A14. See also Baker, supra
note 2.
110
See Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe,
THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1. Amy Grossberg, 18, and her
high school boyfriend were charged with murdering their baby and leaving the body in a
dumpster. The Grossbergs have resisted the subpoena. See also Editorials, Subpoenaed
Parents, 151 N.J.L.J. 926 (1998).
111

See Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910
(February 1987); Harvey Silvergate, American Family Values, NAT’L L.J., November 13,
1995, at A23. Mrs. Pisani, an elderly Italian mother, was subpoenaed to testify against her
son, a patrolman, being investigated in a police-exam cheating scandal. The court refused to
quash to subpoena. Mrs. Pisani refused to testify, and the government did not seek to go
further.
112

See United States v. Elk, 955 F. Supp. 1170 (D. S.D. 1997). Mr. Elk was charged with
the murder of a twenty-month old male child. Prosecutors called his ten-year-old son as a
witness before the grand jury, which the defendant claimed caused the child psychological
trauma.
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All of these people would have had the right to remain loyal to their families and
continue to communicate with them.
VI. SENATE BILL
The Senate takes an entirely different approach.113 Rather than giving outright
support for a parent-child privilege, the Senate attempts a balancing approach. The
Senate proposed that the Attorney General study the development of a parent-child
privilege and the measurements that should be taken to ensure confidentiality of
communications between parents and children.114 The Senate specifically tries to
balance the truth-seeking function of the courts against family confidentiality; where
crimes of violence or drugs are at stake, the family’s privacy rights are secondary.115
The Senate wants to weigh the “danger that free communication between a child and
his or her parent will be inhibited and familial privacy and relationships will be
damaged” against public safety and integrity of the judicial system.116
The bill proposed that the Attorney General, within one year, evaluate the need
for a parent-child privilege. Based on prosecutors’ reluctance to use parents and
children as witnesses against each other because of its dangers,117 it is unlikely that
the Attorney General will find that a parent-child privilege would change the current
state of criminal prosecution. Even if the Attorney General does find a need for a
parent-child privilege, in its attempt to balance the law enforcement needs of society
against the family, the Senate has decided that familial relationships outweigh the
need for truth in all situations except those involving violence or drugs.118 Therefore,
Monica Lewinsky’s mother would be spared, but the Grossberg parents would not.
Mrs. Pisani would be spared, but the ten-year-old child would not.

113

See S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

114

S. 1721 provides in relevant part:

(a) The Attorney General of the United States shall
(1) study and evaluate the manner in which the states have taken measures to protect
the confidentiality of communications between children and parents and, in particular,
whether such measures have been taken in matters that do not involve allegations of
violent or drug trafficking conduct. ...[and submit to Congress]
(b) (2) recommendations based on the findings on the need for and appropriateness of
further action by the Federal Government . . .
(c) the Judicial Conference of the United States shall complete a review and submit a
report to Congress on
(1) whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to guarantee that the
confidentiality of communications by a child to his or her parent in matters that do not
involve allegations of violent or drug trafficking conduct will be adequately protected
in federal court proceedings; and
(2) if the rules should be so amended, a proposal for amendments to the rules that
provides the maximum protection possible for the confidentiality of such
communications.
115

See S. 1721.

116

Id.

117

Discussed infra (p. 16-17).

118

See S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
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The differentiation between crimes of violence or drugs and other crimes does
not serve the purposes of a privilege. Witnesses would still undergo the cruel
trilemma in cases where liberty is severely at stake. In criminal trials of higher
magnitude, society’s need for truth is arguably greater. The Senate’s position states
that society’s benefit in many situations outweighs society’s benefits from strong
family ties. However, in criminal trials where the penalty is more severe, parents
and children are more susceptible to the trilemma; there is also a greater chance of
perjury and frustration of the process. Excluding crimes of violence or drugs from
the protection of the privilege does not alleviate the witness’ trilemma problem as the
loss of liberty is still so significant that the sense of betrayal would still be present
and significant damage to the relationship would occur. The balance that the Senate
attempts to achieve would accomplish the goals of the parent-child privilege in a
distinct minority of cases. The House bill takes a more definitive stance.
VII. EFFECTS
If the House bill passes as introduced, a new parent-child privilege would exist in
federal courts similar to the spousal privilege. This, in reality, would have very little
effect on prosecutors. The Department of Justice realizes special consideration is
warranted when the witness is a close family member and typically tries to avoid
compelling a witness to testify against a family member.119 In practice, Assistant
United States Attorneys are reluctant to use family members.120 Rarely would it be
necessary to use a parent’s testimony; prosecutors attempt to obtain evidence in other
ways so the parental testimony is not necessary.121 According to one experienced
Assistant United States Attorney, in more than ten years of prosecuting experience,
not once has it been an issue where a parent must testify against his or her child.122
Many practitioners are convinced that if a case is so thin that it depends on a parent’s
or child’s testimony, it should not be brought.123 Parents forced to testify against
their child may commit perjury or be willing to be held in contempt in order not to
incriminate their children.124 The parents’ willingness to risk contempt frustrates any
attempt to gather information.125 This does not help achieve the prosecutorial goal of
seeking the truth. Because of this bind, prosecutors rarely seek to pit parents and
119

DEPT. OF JUSTICE MANUAL, §9-23.211 (1997) (“consideration should be given to
whether the witness is a close family relative of the person against whom testimony is sought.
A close family relative is a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling of the
witness. Absent specific justification, we will ordinarily avoid compelling the testimony of a
witness who is a close family relative of the defendant on trial or of the person upon whose
conduct grand jury scrutiny is focusing”) (emphasis added).
120

Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his
name be withheld.
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

See Harvey Silvergate, American Family Values, NAT’L L.J., November 13, 1995, at

A23.
124

See Watts, supra note 9.

125

Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his
name be withheld. See also Mrs. Pisani’s case, supra note 111.
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children against each other.126 Prosecutors recognize the strong emotional ties
between parents and children.127 There is a greater risk of perjury with witnesses
who are family relatives of the defendant, and it is more likely to alienate a jury.128
The chance of perjury would effectively render the testimony useless, and the
confrontation between a parent and child may antagonize a jury.129 In Idaho, where a
parent-chid testimonial privilege prohibits compelling parents from disclosing
confidential communications from their minor children, cases involving minors have
not been made more difficult since enaction of the statute eight years ago.130
If the House bill does pass, it will send a clear message that privacy in the home
outweighs the impediments on the truth-seeking function of the courts. It would say
that family values are worth fostering seriously. If the Senate approach is taken, this
message would be tempered. The message would then be that the war on drugs and
violence is more important than familial autonomy and privacy, but other, less
“wrong” crimes are not.
If the House bill does not pass, the message is more uncertain. On the one hand,
it gives courts more reason not to create a privilege; after all, Congress did not see it
worth legislating so the courts will likely be even more hesitant to create such a new
privilege. However, in creating the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress decided not
to adopt the nine specified privileges, but instead decided to enact Rule 501 which
gave courts power to expand privileges on a case-by-case basis.131 In doing so,
Congress was not “freezing the law.”132 The physician-patient privilege was not
included in the proposed rules and has since gained wide recognition.133 By merely
acknowledging the need for a parent-child privilege, Congress is opening the door
for courts to consider creating one. However, courts have been extremely reluctant
to create such a privilege and have consistently held if one were to be created, it

126

See Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe,
THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1.
127

See Naftali Bendavid, Lewinsky’s Mother Testifies: Starr’s Subpoena Stirs Up Ethical
and Legal Debates, CHI. TRIB., February 11, 1998, at N1, quoting Bruce Yannett, New York
attorney, “Prosecutors recognize there is a vital and important and special relationship
between family members, and that before you intrude on that relationship you’d better have a
compelling reason. . . . John Gotti’s parents weren’t subpoenaed.”
128
Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his
name be withheld.
129

Id.

130

Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1 citing Ken Jorgenson, a deputy
attorney general in Boise, Idaho.
131
See FED. R. EVID. 501; and FED. R. EVID. DELETED
See also Watts, supra note 9, at 589.

AND

SUPERSEDED RULES 502-513.

132

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).

133

See FED. R. EVID. DELETED AND SUPERSEDED RULES 502-513; Franklin, supra note 4, at
149 (more than two-thirds of states statutorily recognize a physician-patient privilege).
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should be left to the legislature.134 It is likely, then, that failure of the House bill
would settle the controversy against a parent-child testimonial privilege.
VIII. PROPOSAL
The purpose of the parent-child privilege should be a combination of the
purposes behind the professional privileges and the spousal privilege. Parent-child
relationships are necessary for the nurturing, growth and survival of both parents and
children.135 Guidance from the parent is vital to the task of parenting just as
guidance from an attorney or physician is vital to his or her tasks. Communication
between parties in these cases should remain confidential to foster an open forum.
However, the parent-child relationship is different from that of a doctor-patient or
attorney-client. Those professional relationships are affirmatively sought out for a
specific reason and limited duration. Parent-child relationships are not affirmatively
sought out by the specific parties involved. The relationship’s goal is to benefit
society by fostering healthy, happy individuals. Betrayal by a parent or child would
likely sever the relationship or create a great deal of harm to this beneficial
relationship.136 The goals of the parent-child privilege should be to allow open
communication for guidance and to foster family relationships which are beneficial
to society.
The House bill accomplishes these goals relatively well. By allowing for a
reciprocal privilege, it alleviates the trauma associated with both a child testifying
against his/her parents and the parent testifying against the child. Protecting
communication between parents and adult children as well as minors considers the
continual need for guidance and fosters intergenerational relationships. Creating a
parent-child privilege, which is in general similar to a spousal privilege, shows that
Congress values parent-child relationships as much as spousal relationships. This
message is consistent with the government’s emphasis on “family values.”137
Structuring the parent-child privilege after the spousal privilege also decreases the
novelty of the privilege; because existing law explains the spousal privilege, the
parent-child privilege law will already be developed.
The House bill fails in its goals, however, by limiting the privilege to confidential
communications only. While this would have protected Marcia Lewis from
revealing Monica Lewinsky’s confidences, it will not alleviate the trauma associated
with testifying against one’s parent or child. Parents or children, if they know
certain testimony will be adverse, are still likely to perjure themselves or refuse to
make a statement to protect their loved ones. Adverse testimony, as well as
communications, should be protected to eliminate these concerns, and neither parent
nor child should be forced to betray the other.
The Senate bill does not achieve the goals of the parent-child privilege. By
limiting the privilege to only those cases not involving violence or drugs, the Senate
still subjects witnesses to the cruel trilemma. The Senate’s statement is that the
parent-child relationship is not valued as much as a spousal relationship since no
134

See cases cited supra note 15.

135

See Scott, supra note 34.

136

Id.

137

See Silvergate, supra note 123.
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such limitation is placed on the spousal privilege. In the Senate’s balance of family
versus crime, society’s interest in punishing drug crimes is more valuable than the
societal interest in fostering and maintaining good parent-child relations. Though the
Senate is attempting to open the debate forum on the issue of parent-child privilege,
its statement is too diluted to be taken seriously. Proposing a study to evaluate if a
parent-child privilege should exist is not taking the concerns of the public seriously,
especially in the aftermath of Marcia Lewis’ compelled testimony.
The ideal parent-child privilege would be created by statute with leeway given to
the courts to develop the privilege in a fashion similar to the spousal privilege. Since
the relationship is not entered into for a specific task, it should not end at a statutespecified age. The privilege would apply to children of all ages, minors and adults.
The privilege would be reciprocal to alleviate the trauma and foster open
communication. If the witness wishes to voluntarily testify against a family member,
he or she should be allowed to do so as there would be no trauma and the
relationship is likely not worth fostering.138 The privilege should be a broad adverse
testimony privilege to diminish the harm associated with betraying a loved one.
Exceptions should be made when a crime is committed by one family member
against another, similar to the spousal privilege exceptions. The House bill is almost
the ideal privilege statute. By including adverse testimony under the protection of
the privilege, the bill would be a model statute.
IX. CONCLUSION
The need for a parent-child privilege can be justified in terms of the
constitutional right to privacy, the societal need to foster parent-child relationships
and the need for individuals to develop their emotional and physical health. The
House’s Confidence in the Family Act139 correctly recognizes the importance of
keeping the family sphere private and loyal. By aiming the statute to protect the
family and alleviate the cruel trilemma that parents and children face when
compelled to testify against each other, the House bill acknowledges the need for a
parent-child privilege by statute. The House bill encourages guidance and
communication by providing for a reciprocal privilege. Including adult children
under the protection of the privilege recognizes the importance of transgenerational
relationships to society. The broad definition of children embodied in the bill
acknowledges the varying and dynamic families of today’s era. The House fails in
its effectiveness in achieving its goals by not providing for an adverse testimony
privilege and instead providing for a limited confidential communications privilege.
An adverse testimony privilege would better serve both goals of fostering
communication and alleviating trauma. The Senate bill,140 with its proposal of a
study, does not effectively recognize the importance of a parent-child privilege. By
not allowing for a parent-child privilege in cases where drugs or violence are
involved, the Senate shows its unwillingness to place much importance on familial
loyalty.
138
See Scott, supra note 34, at 926; but see Scott, supra note 34, at 929, n.89 (defendants
should be able to prevent voluntary testimony in order to prevent prosecutors from improperly
inducing parents or children testify).
139

H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).

140

S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
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The ideal parent-child privilege would be reciprocal, would protect adverse
testimony, and would define children broadly. It would be developed in a fashion
similar to that of the spousal privilege. Creation of a broad parent-child privilege
would be consistent with the fundamental right to family privacy. Creation of such a
privilege would also recognize and allow for loyalty between parents and children.
Finally, creation of a parent-child privilege would foster open, nurturing, and
beneficial relationships between parents and children. The law should recognize a
parent-child privilege to protect the constitutional right to family relationships and to
foster parent-child relationships which are beneficial to society.
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